2 constitutional morality of the rule of law. 7 From this perspective, the Act is marked out as having tempered the absolutism of Dicey's conception of the legal powers of Parliament, 8 and has been argued to have helped to cement the United Kingdom's transition from parliamentary to constitutional democracy. 9 Yet at the 2010 General Election, the future of the HRA provided the backdrop to one of the many inter-party skirmishes of the election campaign, with the Conservative party committed to its repeal and replacement with a British Bill of Rights. 10 In this sphere, the "higher order" and "constitutional" epithets count for little. The responses of the law and of politics could hardly be more starkly opposed.
Responses to he Act, and the protections it provides, have been-and continue to be-polarised. As a result, the broad-based "culture of rights" 11 that the first Blair administration promised would be generated by its human rights project has failed to materialise. In the context of this continued popular and political uncertainty, this book seeks to examine the undoubted influence of the HRA across the three constitutional spheres within which it can be seen to operate: within the un-codified constitution of the United Kingdom, within the context of the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, and finally, on the international plane as the subject of ongoing transnational 'conversations'
on rights and the instruments that protect them. 12 In order to assess the potential legacy of the HRA-and to provide a counterpoint to the Act's continued political fragility-the authors seek to identify trends and developments that hold the potential to outlast the Act that gave rise to them.
This volume brings together a collection of internationally-renowned scholars and lawyers in order to examine the lasting constitutional legacy of the Human Rights Act at a time when its political future is yet to be secured. In the context of debates over the introduction of a Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom, this set of essays examines the clear 
The Human Rights Act 1998-A Short History
May 1997 saw the election of the first Blair administration with manifesto commitments to implement an unprecedented array of constitutional reforms; the abolition of the hereditary principle as a criteria governing membership of the House of Lords, the enactment of Freedom of Information legislation, devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, reform of the party funding mechanisms and reform of the House of Commons were all a part of the new government's ambitious scheme. 13 The introduction of a statute designed to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law was one of the key elements of this new constitutional landscape. The enactment of the HRA in 1998 marked the culmination of a thirty-year campaign for access to the Convention Rights in domestic courts 14 and, for many, provided a tonic for the steady erosion of civil liberties that had taken place during the preceding years of Conservative rule.
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The structure of the HRA differed from that associated with constitutional Bills of Rights elsewhere. The Labour Government was careful in its attempts to provide a statutory protection for rights, while ultimately preserving the primacy of Parliament. As a result, the judges would not find themselves empowered to strike down legislation which contravened the requirements of the Convention, but would instead be permitted to interpret statutory language-so far as that was possible-in order to achieve compatibility. 16 If such an interpretation was not possible, then the Act provided courts with a novel, non-coercive, remedial order-the declaration of incompatibility 17 -which would serve to highlight to the government and Parliament the specific inconsistency between domestic statute and the Convention Rights. 18 Hence, Parliamentary sovereignty was preserved through denying the courts the power to invalidate legislation, 19 and by leaving the elected branches of government with the choice of whether or not to remedy legislation that the courts had identified as contravening the standards required by the Convention. While the protections to be afforded by the Act extended to all public bodies-making it unlawful for them to act in a way which was incompatible with one or more of the Convention Rights 20 -and to private persons exercising public functions, 21 Parliament was explicitly excluded from potential liability. 22 Under the provisions of the Act, legal scrutiny was designed to run in train with 'political rights review.' 23 Upon introducing draft legislation into Parliament, the responsible Minister would be required to make a statement as to the compatibility of the proposed measure in order to provoke rights-focused scrutiny. 24 Ultimately however, Parliament's legislative power would not be subject to substantive restrictions; the autonomy of the legislature was, in form at least, preserved. In setting up this division of power, the Human Rights Act attempted to reconcile an expanded role for the judges in rights protection, with traditional constitutional doctrine and with the scrutiny mechanisms of the political constitution.
16 Section 3(1) HRA 1998. 
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Yet in other respects, the Human Rights Act was a marked departure. While sovereignty was essentially preserved, the separation of powers-the constitutional division of labour between courts, executive and Parliament-was in practice quite radically altered.
The Human Rights Act provided the courts with the tools to hold the executive to account for breaches of fundamental rights, and to scrutinise parliamentary legislation-traditionally substantially immune from such scrutiny 25 -for compatibility with the protections afforded by the Convention Rights These new powers of review were, prior to the implantation of the HRA, thought of as being beyond the constitutional Rubicon. 26 As a result, the classic account of sovereignty, under which parliament legislated subject to no constitutional reservations, 27 had-though ceding to the courts these powers of proto-constitutional review-arguably given way to a more cohesive system of checks and balances.
The design of the HRA therefore attempted to blend the radical with the orthodox;
rights would be judicially-protected, but not at the (explicit at least) expense of Parliament's sovereignty. It is perhaps no surprise then that as a result, much of the substantive debate over the correct application of the HRA is to the found in the reconciliation of this expanded judicial role with the ideal of democratic governance. 28 In spite of its novel structure, the HRA has not been allowed it to escape the anti-democratic accusations that dog constitutional have served to underpin reform of the structure of government itself. 43 Giving effect to the HRA has prompted changes to the cultures and processes of political and legal decisionmaking which might be seen to have lasting impact, within the constitution, on the United
Kingdom's relationships with Strasbourg, and in the international context in which the credence of legally-enforceable human rights continues to gain currency.
Part I-The Human Rights Act in Constitutional Perspective
The relationship between political and judicial power is a vexed one, especially controversial in a state-such as the United Kingdom-that lacks a foundational constitutional document from which the elected branches and judiciary draw their powers. The absence of a written constitution has necessarily shaped the particular form that controversy over judicial supremacism has taken in the United Kingdom. Commentators on all sides appeal to the twin doctrines of the rule of the law and parliamentary sovereignty, but ambiguity about these key concepts and their specific application gives considerable scope for disagreement and misunderstanding.
The most generous version argues that there is no conflict of values over the Human Rights Act 1998, that the scheme itself has created an entirely new constitutional model within which parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacism have been reconciled. Ronald Dworkin calls, in another context, the distinction between "strong" and "weak" discretion. 58 Even if, after a period of suitable observation, we were to conclude that a declaration of incompatibility is in end result to a strike down of legislation, political actors nevertheless retain decisive influence over the timing, the form and the extent of legislative change by way of response. The inability of the courts to legislate in a judgment that is fact- In order to preserve the ability of Parliament to legislate subject to no legal constraints, domestic courts may not strike down or otherwise invalidate primary legislation which contravenes the requirements of the Convention. Instead, the HRA-under s.4-provides that courts might issue a declaration of primary legislation's incompatibility with the Convention. Such a declaration is of no legal effect on the parties to the case, on government or on Parliament. The coercive force of a declaration of incompatibility instead can be found in the political pressure that will result from the finding of a superior court that domestic legislation does not meet the standards which the United Kingdom can be expected to adhere as a party to the European Convention on Human Rights. 67 While in practice, the issue of a declaration of incompatibility has resulted in legislative change-or of the initiation of a process designed to remedy the legislative incompatibility-such change has not necessarily been a timely or direct response to the declaration issued.
The novelty of this process has given rise to much discussion about its place within "dialogue" between the courts and the political branches of the state. One judge has gone so far as to remark that that declarations of incompatibility are "essentially political in character rather than legal." 68 Indeed there is some debate over whether it can be seen as a remedy at all because of the lack of tangible individualised benefits to the litigant to whom a declaration is awarded, both in domestic law and from the perspective of effectiveness under Article 13 64 Section 6(1) HRA 1998. 65 Section 6(3)(b) HRA 1998. 66 Sections 3(2) and 4(6) HRA 1998. 67 Though, as we have seen, the difference between the declaration of incompatibility and a clear power of "strike down" has been argued by some to be of form alone (see eg: T. Campbell, "Incorporation through 13 of the Convention system as a whole. 69 In chapter 3 Colin Murray examines the declaration of incompatibility within the broader context of inter-action between the judiciary and the other branches. Murray's analysis suggests that post-HRA "dialogue" should be understood against a wider time-frame and in the context of more informal modes of inter-action. Seen in this way the volume and intensity of judicial attempts to promote law reform has grown since 2000 but this process is by no means such a constitutional novelty as some have suggested.
Nevertheless at times there has been a lack of parliamentary engagement, so much so that the judges have frequently been "dancing without a partner" or with one that shows at best only token interest. 
Part III-A Permanent Revolution in Legal Reasoning?
In Part III the focus of the discussion turns to the emerging record of responses to rightsbased argument among members of the United Kingdom's highest courts, the ability of judges to produce reasoning that is persuasive to international judges, the continuing utility of the common law in protecting human rights, and the differing techniques of legal argument required of advocates advancing human rights claims.
The ways in which legal argument and reasoning has adapted to the incorporation into United Kingdom law of a substantial body of extrinsic law are topics worthy of specific investigation in considering the long-term impact of the HRA. 78 It can be argued that, since, unlike many European legal systems, the common law underwent no historical process of Specific consideration is given to the idea of common law fundamental rights. 85 While there is some debate about the origins of these rights 86 seeking to legitimise the increased susceptibility of policy decisions to judicial rights-based scrutiny is a perennial concern. But for those seeking to reform the bases on which human rights are protected in the United Kingdom, addressing all of these questions will be an essential precursor to the introduction of any successor instrument to the Human Rights Act which is designed to be consistent with our constitutional heritage. 
Part IV-The Human Rights Act on the International Plane
The HRA is arguably as notable for those comparable instruments from which it took inspiration as those constitutional templates which were rejected by its framers. In fact, as Conor Gearty has argued, it is in the rejection of the "orthodox precedents" of constitutional Bills of Rights-specifically, those that enable the courts to invalidate primary legislationthat the "genius" of the HRA can be found. 92 Questions of constitutional design and of the migration of institutional and jurisprudential models 93 form the subject of Part IV, which examines the impact of the HRA and judicial approaches to its interpretation, in Australia, 
